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ABSTRACT
Why do rebels kill each other? When confronting a formidable
regime, rebels often descend into warring factionalism rather than
forge unity across their ranks to reap the advantages of cooperation.
This article tackles the puzzle of inter-rebel fratricide. It explores
power and resource competition arguments, and contrasts them
with ideological mechanisms that can drive inter-rebel violence. It
argues that ideological extremity is central to rebel fratricide. Rebel
organizations with common ideological origins can still compete with
each other based on their degree of centrism and extremism, making
them ideologically distant. This proximity-distance paradox makes
their cohabitation mutually threatening. Ideological challengers
from the same family tree are particularly threatening to one’s
group cohesion, and if successful, guarantee one’s political margin-
alization within the broader movement. Extremist groups are likely to
respond to these threats with fratricide, while ideologically centrist
ones will rely on other strategies such as balancing, outbidding, or
defecting to manage their rivalries. Algeria’s civil war, 1992–2002, is a
plausibility probe case study that illustrates these causal mechanisms.
The study contributes to a burgeoning literature on the role of
ideology in armed civil conflicts.
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Insurgencies and civil wars reveal an interesting paradox. Rebels facing a formidable
regime often opt to fight each other rather than forge unity across their ranks to oppose
their common adversary. Unity is believed to improve rebels’ fighting capabilities, making
them difficult to defeat. When cooperation is institutionalized in formal alliances between
several major groups with joint command and control over military operations, it
increases the rebels’ odds of success.1 Conversely, infighting consumes lives and resources,
enables incumbent regimes to deploy “divide and conquer” strategies, and sometimes
prompts rebel defections to the state.2 Warring factions often end up in protracted
conflicts with no victory in sight, or end up negotiating outcomes that usually fall short
of their movement’s initial goals.3 Yet, despite the risks and costs associated with disunity,
rebels often choose competition over cooperation, and even descend into internecine
conflicts. The history of insurgencies and civil wars is replete with episodes of inter-
rebel violence,4 leading one expert to conclude that “a revolutionary’s worst enemy is
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often another revolutionary.”5 How can we explain this paradox? Why do rebels kill each
other instead of reaching a modus vivendi that allows them to stay focused on the ultimate
prize of toppling the regime?
This study outlines several ideological mechanisms that drive inter-rebel conflicts, and
contrasts them with power and resource competition arguments. It argues that rebel
fratricide is most likely to emerge when rival factions that are competing for the same
constituency perceive their irreconcilable ideological divides as a major threat to their
factional survival. Ideological organizations from the same family tree (e.g., communists,
nationalists, or fundamentalists) can still splinter between extremists and centrists.6 Their
ideological proximity based on their common intellectual heritage makes them credible
voices to movement fighters, supporters, and sponsors. Yet their ideological distance on
key conflict issues means that their disagreements can divide their fighters, followers, and
sponsors between two viable alternatives. This proximity-distance paradox—proxidistant
for short—produces two threats that unleash an impulse to suppress ideological rivals: a
threat to intra-factional cohesion, which could produce defections to a rival faction, and a
threat of inter-factional marginalization, where the success of a rival produces a direct loss
to one’s faction (i.e., a zero-sum game).
The argument goes one step further. Fearing defections and marginalization, factions
can undertake a number of strategies to mitigate these dual threats, including balancing,
outbidding, spoiling, defecting, and fighting. This study hypothesizes that only ideologi-
cally extreme factions will contemplate fratricide to address threats emanating from
factional competition, while ideologically centrist ones will opt for strategies that fall
short of aggressively killing their rivals. Extremists are more attuned to ideological
distance than centrists, they are more prone to belief superiority than their counterparts,
and their extremism in other domains engenders a permissive ideational structure for
violence against fellow rebels.
It is important to note at the outset that what makes one faction extreme and another
centrist is determined independently of inter-rebel fratricide—they are exogenous to
violent infighting. The centrism-extremism divide is measured along three dimensions:
conflict framing, conflict objectives, and targeting policies. When rebels emerge to fight an
incumbent regime, some adopt extreme narratives, objectives, and targeting policies, while
others adopt less hawkish discourses, goals, and repertoires of violence. These factions
compete with each other on the basis of their divergent ideological positions. At a certain
point, one faction—the one that began with an extremist worldview—chooses to eliminate
its rivals instead of simply compete with them. Thus, terms like centrists and extremists in
this study are not used tautologically, but determined before the onset of inter-rebel
fratricide.
The Algerian civil war, which took place between 1992 and 2002, is a plausibility probe
case study that illustrates these theoretical claims through a rich, analytically descriptive
account of factional conflicts, carefully tracing the process by which ideological cleavages
facilitated fratricide. Algeria’s “black decade,” as it came to be known, featured intense
factional competition and eventually fratricidal violence within the Islamist movement,
mainly between the Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Armé, GIA) and the Islamic
Salvation Army (Armée Islamique du Salut, AIS). Combining primary and secondary sources,
and publicly available interviews with insurgent leaders that laid down their arms following
the 1999–2000 government amnesty, this article highlights the direct role ideology played in





































structuring the rebel movement into competing armed factions and driving inter-rebel
violence between its extremists and centrist groups. The ideological argument is tested in
relation to competing hypotheses, principally power and resource competition.
The article proceeds in four sections. First, it introduces the conceptual context
surrounding the phenomenon of competitive factionalism and outlines four ways in
which rebels can compete with each other that fall short of infighting. The next section
presents competing resource, power, and ideological hypotheses that can explain the
dependent variable of fratricidal violence, outlining their causal mechanisms in the
process. The third section presents a detailed narrative of warring factionalism in
Algeria’s civil war, and highlights how the proximity-distance paradox contributed to
inter-rebel fratricide. It also assesses the competing power distribution and resource
competition hypotheses in light of the Algerian case study. The article concludes with a
summary of its theoretical contribution and suggests research extensions.
The spectrum of competitive factionalism
Rebels often constitute rival factions that compete with each other through balancing,7
spoiling,8 defecting,9 and outbidding.10 Given the range of options available to rebels to
manage their rivalries, why do some turn to fratricide? Few have taken on this puzzle
directly.11 Fratricide involves rebels violently intimidating or coercing rivals, but in its
most extreme form involves the extermination of rival leaders, fighters, organizations, and
their supportive constituencies.12 Its underlying purpose is to monopolize power, maximize
decision-making autonomy, remove potential spoilers, and minimize the need to share post-
conflict spoils with competitors. Rebel fratricide, therefore, is qualitatively distinct from other
forms of competitive factionalism because it is intended to kill other rebels, not just compete
with them. To amplify this distinction, it is useful to summarize the many forms of factional
competition in terms of their objectives, causal drivers, and common outcomes (see Table 1).
Balancing
Multiparty civil wars constitute anarchic environments where no overarching authority can
enforce binding commitments and protect rebels from predation at the hands of rival armed
groups. Factions have to mind their own survival and interests by enhancing their relative
power vis-à-vis rivals. Balancing is one strategy to ensure that a rival faction does not become
too dominant in the rebel movement. Rebel groups could aggregate their capabilities to
balance against the forces of a rival faction, precluding the latter from threatening their
survival or interests. Balancing arises in accordance with the logic of minimum winning
coalitions—ones with sufficient aggregate power to win the conflict, but with as few partners
as possible to maximize one’s share of postwar political spoils.13 Because power realignments
occur frequently in civil wars, alliances are highly unstable. The quest for minimum winning
coalitions can generate endless side switching to maintain a delicate balance of power.
Spoiling
A rebel faction often competes with its rival by intentionally undermining its ability to act
as the sole legitimate representative of the movement in conflict-ending negotiations. For





































rebel groups that aspire to take the lead in the future representation of their national
constituency, the negotiation process can grant them recognition, legitimacy, and
concessions.14 Spoiling the process, therefore, deprives them of this opportunity.
Spoiling occurs in at least two ways. Rebels can produce timely violence to signal to the
incumbent regime that its rebel interlocutor lacks the ability to control the movement and,
therefore, that it should not trust in its ability to deliver on its end of the bargain.15 Rebels
can also spoil negotiations through escalatory violence that radicalizes the opposing side in
a conflict and invites reprisal attacks against one’s own constituency. This dynamic of
rebel aggression and retaliatory state violence makes it difficult for rebel negotiators to
conclude a peace deal because their constituent publics will be less inclined toward
peace.16 Like balancing, spoiling is intended to undermine rivals, not fight with them or
eliminate them directly.
Outbidding
Outbidding is a form of competitive factionalism intended to address the issue of who can
best represent the interests of the rebel constituency and achieve its objectives.17 Rebel
factions compete with each other by making the case that they alone can deliver the public
goods desired by the rebel movement and its supporters. Outbidding among rival groups
can work in two ways. In situations where opposing communities in a civil conflict are
polarized and demand punishing violence against out-groups, rebel factions can compete
Table 1. Forms of competitive factionalism in fragmented civil conflicts.
Form Objective(s) Causal Driver(s) Outcome(s)
Balancing Prevent rivals from monopolizing




in concerns for relative power
Movement divided into balanced
coalitions, but side switching and
opportunistic alliances are
frequent
Spoiling Undermine the ability of rivals to
negotiate conflict-ending
settlements
Negotiation process elevates one
faction above its rivals,
threatening their ability to claim




competition among rival factions
over movement leadership
Outbidding Seek leadership of the rebel
movement or greater “market
share” of public support by
differentiating one’s faction from
rivals
● Demand by supporters for
punishing violence against the
opposing side in the conflict
● State repression of established
movement leadership creates
an opportunity for new factions
to seek leadership of the
movement
Escalation of violence by rival
factions directed against the
incumbent regime or its
constituent publics; non-violent
competition between factions
through the provision of public
goods
Defecting Seek support from an incumbent
regime or flip to a rival faction
against one’s former allies
● Economic and material entice-
ment by state or rival factions
● Fratricide by rivals invites pro-
tection-seeking behavior
Cease rebellious activities and
switch loyalties to the incumbent
regime to help bring about an
end to the rebellion, or switch
loyalties to rival factions
Fratricide Intimidate, coerce, or eliminate





organizational purges, and mass
violence against supporters of
rival factions





































with each other by delivering attacks that are qualitatively and quantitatively superior to
their rivals’ attacks. In doing so, they increase their popularity within their communities,
which in turn produces greater legitimacy, recruits, and resources.18 Rebels can also
compete with rivals by distinguishing themselves through the provision of public goods
to their supportive constituencies.19 Outbidding could be triggered by another mechan-
ism. Regime repression can remove the established political leadership of a contentious
movement, triggering competition for succession within the movement. An emergent
rebel group can rise from obscurity and ascend the leadership hierarchy ladder by
escalating violence against an incumbent regime to demonstrate its superior commitment
to the cause.20
Defecting
Defection in the context of inter-rebel competition entails groups abandoning their
factional allies and, instead, switching to fight for factions against which they previously
competed. This form of side switching is rampant in multiethnic patrimonial political
systems, where the state is failing and the need to secure material resources is of para-
mount concern. Rebels prioritize their economic survival above in-group loyalty or rebel
victory. Local leaders commanding armed men switch sides as new patrons make them-
selves available through the provision of cash payments, weapons, salaried positions, or
control over the flow of humanitarian aid, among other material rewards.21
Staniland offers another mechanism that leads to defection.22 He argues that the predatory
conduct of hegemonic rebel factions toward weak groups precipitates protection-seeking
behavior in the form of defections. Rebel groups fearing elimination in a two-front war
with the incumbent regime and the dominant insurgent group will choose to defect to the
state. The “fratricidal flipping” theory offered by Staniland treats rebel fratricide as the causal
(independent) variable, and defection as the outcome (dependent variable). He does not seek
to explain the origins of fratricidal violence, but assumes it and proceeds to explain its effect
on ethnic defection.
This study is interested in fratricide as the dependent variable and wants to explore its
underlying causes. The aforementioned theories address rebel fragmentation and compe-
tition, but they do not address directly the question of why rebels initiate fratricidal
violence against their fellow rebels. The following section offers competing resource,
power, and ideological hypotheses to explain inter-rebel violence.
Competing explanations of fratricidal rebellions
Inter-rebel fratricide is highly controversial and carries many risks. A predatory rebel
faction risks delegitimation if it cannot justify its fratricide to its ardent supporters, and
rationalize it within the broader rebel movement. It also runs the risk of diverting valuable
material and human resources while also engaging in battle with an incumbent regime. It
goes without saying that it is an extremely dangerous endeavor that can result in failure, or
at least protracted factional wars. Therefore, it is necessary to theorize the conditions that
lead some rebel groups to undertake the leap from competition to fratricide.





































Power and resource competition
Fjelde and Nilsson maintain that power considerations, contextualized in the political
economy of violence, incentivize rebel infighting.23 Rebels require economic and financial
resources to sustain their organizations, enhance their relative power in the face of rival
factions, and build political leverage against incumbent regimes. Therefore, economic
considerations are of utmost significance in rebellious movements and will invariably
drive inter-rebel competition and conflict.
Factional infighting over economic resources is likely to manifest in contexts where the
government is weak, giving rebels space to prioritize their rivalries above their security. If
the regime is relatively strong, rebel groups have to mind their security first and foremost,
and may need other factions to aggregate capabilities to ward off regime offensives. But
when the regime is weak or virtually non-existent, rebels can afford to take risks to
enhance their relative power position at the expense of their rivals.
Infighting is also likely when the distribution of power between rival factions is
asymmetric because equally matched factions deter aggression. Fjelde and Nilsson argue
that while strong groups are better positioned to eliminate their rivals, weak groups have
an incentive to initiate fighting as well because, if successful, their payoff is quite high. The
implication is that power asymmetry—unequal distribution of capabilities—would be
most conducive to rebel infighting.
Finally, infighting is likely in rebel-controlled territories with “easily extractable and
valuable natural resources, such as diamonds, oil, drugs, and other contraband.”24 Control
over those resources can translate into rebel power. Under these scope conditions,
territorial control becomes a higher priority for rebels than fighting against the incumbent
regime.
The power and resource competition theory yields the following expectations for the
Algerian case study:
Hypothesis 1: Rebel fratricide emerges when rebels feel confident about their ability to ward
off regime offensives and ultimately defeat the regime.
Hypothesis 2: Imbalance of power between rival rebel factions is a precondition for fratri-
cide, with the greater likelihood that strong factions will seek to eliminate the
weak ones.
Hypothesis 3: Rebel fratricide will most likely be concentrated in resource-rich regions where
economic control translates into military and political power.
Ideology as an alternative explanation
Rebel groups are not just divided by their power capabilities; they are also fragmented
along their ideological preferences. Most often, the rift is quite clear, as in secular-religious
divide, ethno-sectarian divides, or loyalists-separatists splits. Stark ideological differences
can violate deeply held normative commitments and create mutual mistrust about the
future intentions of rival rebels. Indeed, ideologically distant groups are likely to view





































conflict between them as inevitable, increasing the likelihood of competition and conflict
during the course of the civil war.
Less clear, however, are movements that are ideologically connected yet deeply divided
on core conflict issues such as who is the primary enemy, who are the legitimate targets of
the civil war, and what are the ultimate objectives of the struggle. Ideological movements
are heterogeneous despite their neat categorization under labels of nationalists, socialists,
separatists, or fundamentalists. As DeNardo observed sardonically over three decades ago,
“factional debates seem like preposterous exercises in ideological hairsplitting, only to be
dismissed as window dressing for clashes of personality, struggles for power, or some
other essentially personal or accidental process.”25 In reality, they can turn ideologically
proximate groups into bitter enemies, despite their shared intellectual genealogy and
utopian visions.
The proximity-distance paradox (proxidistant for short) can be operationalized along
three dimensions: conflict framing, conflict objectives, and targeting portfolios.26
Ideological divergence along the three dimensions yields a centrist-extremist divide in
kindred movements. Table 2 captures these differences.
Conflict framing refers to how factions construct a shared understanding of the civil
conflict in which they are active participants. It answers three basic questions: who are we,
why are we fighting, and whom are we fighting against? Conflict framing is intended to
diagnose the causes of the crisis, attribute blame for its perpetuation, and activate political
identities for collective action.27 In doing so, it constructs one’s primary in-group in
relation to a threatening out-group.28 Threat attribution can be narrowly cast against a
specific leader, a coterie of elites, and a set of policies, or it can encompass the entire
political order, its institutions, and all its laws, representatives, and supporters. Centrists
opt for nuanced conflict framing that recognizes the complexity of competing political
actors and their preferences, while extremists promote a Manichean (“us vs. them”)
narrative of the conflict.
Conflict objectives answer the question, what are we fighting for? Ideologically prox-
imate groups can diverge on the ideological-strategic question of limited versus total war,
or system integration versus system transformation. Rebels pursuing system transforma-
tive objectives seek the overthrow of the state and the radical refashioning of the polity by
elevating new institutions, elites, and policies. Proponents of system transformation
usually portray extant state institutions as irrevocably corrupt, inherently illegitimate—
even heretical—and simply beyond reform. Participation in these institutions results in
movement cooptation and outright corruption of its leaders.29 Integrationist rebels, on the
other hand, do not necessarily wish to transform existing state institutions but rather
Table 2. Ideological distance between extremists and centrists.
Ideological Dimension Extremists Centrists
Conflict Framing ● Manichean (“us vs. them”)
● Out-group homogenization
(“they are all the same”)
● Out-group demonization (“they
are all evil”)
● Nuanced and multiplex
● Differentiates opponents by degrees of culpability for
conflict onset and perpetuation
Conflict Objectives Total war for system
transformation
Limited war for system integration
Targeting Portfolio Expansive and indiscriminate Bounded and selective





































remove obstacles to their inclusion and participation in those institutions. In other words,
the conflict is about reforming the polity through corrective policies and new political
actors, not the revolutionary transformation of the state. Centrists are open to system
integration while extremists insist on system transformation.
Targeting portfolios answer the question, what are the legitimate targets of our struggle?
While targeting is usually a tactical or strategic issue, it can be ideological if certain
categories of people are deemed to be enemies by the mere fact that they represent a
detested out-group excluded from the “universe of obligation.”30 Gutiérrez Sanín and
Wood find that ideology is critically important in producing two distinct outcomes in civil
wars: mass killing and controlled violence.31 This is consistent with findings by Costalli
and Ruggeri in Italy’s civil war (1943–1945),32 Thaler in Mozambique’s and Angola’s wars
of independence,33 and Goodwin in South Africa.34 Out-group homogenization and
dehumanization are the usual mechanisms by which such violence is rationalized.35
Centrists insist on controlled and selective violence, while extremists are inclined to use
expansive and indiscriminate violence.
Ideological challengers along the centrist-extremist divide threaten intra-factional cohe-
sion, which could produce mass defections, and raise the prospect of inter-factional
marginalization, which could undermine the political aspirations of the factional leaders.
These dual threats, in turn, set the stage for competition, conflict, and fratricide.
Ideological challengers as threats to intra-factional cohesion
Rebel organizations require ideological cohesion to be effective, especially if rebels lack
sufficient economic resources to pay for leadership allegiance and incentivize rebellion.36
Ideology can help bind rebels to their leadership, motivate commitment and sacrifice,
remove inhibitions to violence, and reprioritize collective incentives above personal
aspirations. That is why insurgent organizations from diverse traditions—Marxists,
Maoists, ethnonationalists, and Islamists—dedicate time and resources to socialize their
recruits ideologically.37
Proxidistant ideological challengers can undermine factional cohesion through two
mechanisms. When a rival rebel group with overlapping ideological precepts frames
the conflict in ways that challenge one’s own framing of the conflict, not only does it
violate the group’s normative commitments and political preferences, it also presents a
challenge to intra-group fidelity. Truly distant ideological rivals—ones with little in
common with one’s factional ideology—are less threatening to intra-group cohesion
than rivals from the same ideological family tree. Really distant factions are not seen as
credible alternatives to one’s supportive constituency, fighters, and funding sources.
However, this is not the case with rivals who share one’s values, ideals, and intellectual
origins. The possibility of an alternative framing of the conflict from a credible rival
could encourage internal dissension and produce defections, which threaten to dele-
gitimize the leadership of a rebel group and draw away valuable cadres and material
resources.38 Groups, therefore, have an incentive to engage in boundary policing39 in
order to maintain intra-factional unity and foreclose opportunities for defections. This
leads to the prediction that:





































Hypothesis 4: Rebel fratricide is likely to emerge among ideologically proximate groups that
nonetheless have diametrically opposed framing of the conflict.
The second mechanism relates to the difference between centrist and extremist target-
ing. Extremist rebel groups that engage in indiscriminate violence are likely to encounter
critiques from centrist rebels that oppose such violence on ethical or strategic grounds.40
Critiques from ideologically proximate rivals can undermine the legitimacy of indiscrimi-
nate tactics and the leaders who deploy them. Such critiques can call into question the
moral foundations of the group’s leadership, casting doubt on its authority to lead the
movement. Silencing critics becomes a necessary condition for anticipating internal
leadership challenges and maintaining intra-group unity in the face of external agitation.
This leads to the prediction that:
Hypothesis 5: Rebel fratricide is likely to emerge among ideologically proximate groups that
nonetheless have diametrically opposed targeting portfolios.
Ideological challengers as threats to inter-factional marginalization
When ideologically proximate factions pursue diametrically opposed conflict goals—
system integration versus system transformation—the success of one faction can translate
into the political marginalization of the other. Revolutionaries are not interested in
maintaining the existing order, and they usually advance new leaders from outside the
established reform-minded opposition, thus threatening the future of centrist leadership.
On the other hand, the success of centrists in pursuing system integration usually entails
the suppression of its radical periphery, thus threatening the extremist leadership. The
mutual exclusivity of rebel conflict goals becomes a zero-sum competition that could
invite rebel conflict and fratricide. This leads to the following prediction:
Hypothesis 6: Rebel fratricide is likely to emerge among groups with diametrically opposed
conflict objectives.
Ideological extremity and differential responses to factional threats
Not all rebel groups respond to threat perceptions in the same way. Extremist factions are
more likely than centrist ones to deploy fratricide when threatened by proxidistant
ideological challengers. Four reasons help explain why that is the case. Ideologically
extreme individuals are much more attuned to the presence of ideological distance,
which is to say they have a tendency “to perceive greater distance between competing
political alternatives” than those that are less extreme.41 Additionally, ideologically
extreme individuals, regardless of political content, are more prone to “belief superiority”
than centrist ones, which in turn is associated with the tendency toward belief rigidity or
“non-corruptibility.”42 Relatedly, ideologically extreme individuals have been shown to be
more intolerant of divergent political beliefs than those who are ideologically less
extreme.43 Individuals with extreme beliefs also exhibit a greater preference for certainty





































than centrist individuals, and high levels of uncertainty are associated with a high sense of
threat.44 Lastly, ideologically extreme groups with revolutionary goals are likely to have
developed a permissive ideational structure, or what Leader Maynard terms “permissive
moral logic,”45 to justify mass violence toward the regime and civilians that stand in the
way of their transformative project. This ideational scaffolding can be used to dispatch
rebels who are not adhering to ideological dogma. All this leads to the prediction:
Hypothesis 7: Extremist factions are more likely to respond violently to proxidistant ideolo-
gical challengers than centrist factions.
The Algerian civil war during the 1990s featured a fratricidal war between the GIA and
AIS, as well as intra-GIA bloodletting. It culminated with massacres against civilians loyal
to the AIS and those that split from the GIA. The case is intended as a plausibility probe of
the ideological mechanisms leading to inter-rebel violence, and provides an opportunity to
assess the power and resource competition hypotheses as well.
Algeria’s civil war, 1992–2002
In 1989, Algeria embarked on major political and institutional reforms in the aftermath of
mass anti-state riots in the previous year. A new constitution officially ended the one-party
system, opening a path for liberal and Islamist opposition groups to directly challenge the
historic monopoly of the ruling National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale,
FLN). Islamists took advantage of this opportunity by forming the Islamic Salvation Front
(Front Islamique du Salut, FIS) party.
After a landslide victory for the FIS at municipal and provincial elections in June 1990, other
Islamist parties began to emerge, including the Islamic SocietyMovement (Harakat al-Mujtama
al-Islami, HAMAS) and the Islamic RenaissanceMovement (Mouvement de laNahda Islamique,
MNI). Along with official Islamist parties emerged a number of small groups with an extremist
orientation that opposed electoral participation.46 Thesewould later form thenucleus of theGIA.
These diverse groups, organizations, and parties populated the Islamist factional landscape and
they competed for the loyalty of the entire Islamist field. They included Salafists, Muslim
Brothers, Djaz’ara, and Algerian “Afghans.” Table 3 briefly describes these factions.
The FIS initially submerged some of these tendencies into its front andmanaged to win 188
out of 430 national assembly seats in the first round of voting in December 1991. It was poised
to win an overwhelming majority of seats in the second round of voting set for January 1992,
but Algeria’s generals intervened to halt the electoral process. They forced President Chadli
Benjedid to resign and declared a state of emergency. They also dissolved the FIS and a
military court sentenced its two leaders, Abassi Madani and Ali Belhaj, to 12 years in prison.
Thousands of FIS cadres were rounded up and detained as well. State repression and Islamist
insurgency marked the beginning of the “black decade.” Some estimate the death toll in the
civil war to be as high as 200,000—6,000–18,000 persons had disappeared as well.47
Competitive factionalism after state repression, 1992–1994
The ideological cleavages that were submerged within the FIS were unleashed in the
armed movement. Several rebel groups emerged along the lines of pre-war ideological





































divides. Some Arab Afghans and Jihadi Salafists joined the Islamic State Movement
(Mouvement pour L’etat Islamique, MEI), but many flocked to the GIA. The Djaz’ara
strand formed the Islamic Front for Armed Jihad (Front Islamique pour le Djihad Armé,
FIDA), and other FIS activists operated under the label of the Armed Islamic Movement
(Mouvement Islamique Armé, MIA).48 Other groups formed during the course of the
rebellion as well. Table 4 lists the major factions that appeared between 1992 and 2002.
A major turning point in the rebellion came in May 1994. Several notable leaders that
were part of the FIS during the electoral phase agreed to join the GIA. Muhammad Said,
Abderrazak Rejjam, and Yousuf Boubras came as representatives of the FIS Provisional
National Executive Bureau (which later became FIS’s post-coup “crisis cell”).49 The May
1994 merger also included Said Makhloufi, a former FIS leader who had formed the MEI
in 1992. This unification was a major blow to the centrist wing of the FIS, which up to this
point was concentrated in the MIA. The emergence of the GIA, and consolidation under
its banner, marked the ascendancy of the revolutionaries and marginalization of the
pragmatists within the Islamist movement.
Table 3. Pre-civil war ideological cleavages.
Ideological Strand Description
Salafists Believe Muslims should be ruled by an Islamic state organized according to the precepts of
the Quran, the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad (Sunna), and the formative Islamic
generations, or the righteous forefathers (al-Salaf al-Salih). They also believe that Islamic law
(sharia) is a set of religious, social, and economic rules that should be applied in every
Muslim society across the ages. They reject Western norms and mores, and reject the
institution of democracy. While they are not entirely opposed to political activism and
parliamentary participation, they view these strategies as an extension of their dawa
(religious preaching) work, and they run the risk of fermenting hizbiyya (partisan party
politics that unduly divides Muslims). Some pragmatic Salafists, however, have relaxed these
precepts to allow for political participation in order to Islamize secular institutions.
Muslim Brotherhood Represented by HAMAS in Algeria during the period under consideration, the Muslim
Brotherhood is a conservative political integrationist movement that insists on legalism,
gradualism, and constitutionalism. As such, it believes in democratic participation and
political accommodation with the state, even as it works to establish an Islamic polity. When
political avenues are closed, it retreats to civic activism and dawa work, thus rejecting the
use of violence against the state.
Djaz’ara Literally meaning Algerianists, this tendency rejects the dogma of contemporary Salafists,
especially their belief that Islamic law can be applied in the same manner across the Muslim
world—hence the title Algerianists. It is closer to the Islamic “modernists,” especially the
Algerian Islamist philosopher Malek Bennabi (1905–73), who held that Islam must be
reinterpreted in light of historical transformations and must be adapted to different national
contexts.102 The Djaz’ara, similar to the Muslim Brotherhood, alternated between clandestine
activism and overt participation in electoral democracy. This strand came to dominate the
FIS leadership after June 1991, and is detested by the Salafists.
Jihadi Salafists Similar to Salafists in many ways, except they insist that a singular focus on preaching is
insufficient to bring about an Islamic state, and reject any form of parliamentary
participation. Militant activism is necessary given the resources of the modern secular state
and its power to forestall the rise of a genuine Islamic polity. Preparing for violence is an
imperative because of the inevitability of confrontation with the secular order.
“Algerian Afghans” While not an ideological strand per se, the “Afghans” generally gravitated toward Jihadi
Salafist and other extremist tendencies. The term refers to hundreds of Algerians who
volunteered to join the jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan during the 1980s.
Many of these “Afghans” returned to Algeria during the political liberalization phase, and
they subsequently played a prominent role in forming the armed movement after the coup,
especially the GIA.





































Cherif Gousmi, the commander of the GIA at the time of unification, based the merger
on strict ideological boundaries. All the parties involved had to adhere to the Salafist
tradition and abandon any doctrinal “innovations” (i.e., Djaz’ara beliefs).50 The GIA also
refused any unity with the political wing of the FIS and made it clear that it was not its
armed wing.51 Despite symbolically appointing Abassi and Belhaj to its consultative
council, the GIA unequivocally opposed the electoral strategy of the FIS and insisted
that any unity with the latter had to be based on a renunciation of elections, parliaments,
and democracy.52 The unification communiqué declared that “the GIA is the only
legitimate organization for jihad in Algeria” and “all mujahedeen must join the GIA.”53
Confronted with the possibility of losing leadership over the rebel movement, the FIS opted
to balance against the GIA. Field commanders loyal to the FIS in the western and eastern regions
rejected the May 1994 unification under the banner of the GIA; they formed the AIS instead.
The AIS officially declared Abassi and Belhadj as their political leaders, and the FIS as its political
movement. It also declared Madani Mezraq the national commander of the AIS. The latter was
clear in his intention to balance against the newly hegemonic faction, which threatened to
marginalize the FIS by “melting” it within the GIA. According to Mezraq, after the defection of
the only remaining free FIS leaders to the GIA, the FIS “amounted to nothingmore than a small
faction under the umbrella of the GIA and its leader Abu Abdullah [Cherif] Gousmi.”54
The AIS quickly moved to regain FIS’s hegemony in the Islamist movement. It issued a
number of open letters in which it denounced the expansive violence of the GIA and
called upon armed groups to rally behind the FIS and its armed wing. In one letter,
Madani Mezraq urged fighters to join the AIS to wage a jihad that is legitimate, with clear
contours and limited objectives. He also urged them to beware of those suspicious
elements that easily denounce Muslims as infidels without religious foundations or
credible evidence. In an implicit criticism of GIA’s increasingly daring attacks, he
reminded his audience that jihad is not suicide, revenge, adventurism, anarchy, or blind
zeal. In another letter that condemns violence against civilians, he states, “we fight among
men, we do not kill the old, women or children.”55 This direct challenge of GIA’s targeting
Table 4. Major insurgent factions in Algeria’s civil war, 1992–2002.
Rebel Faction Acronym
Year





Salafist Became AIS in 1994
Mouvement pour L’etat
Islamique
MEI 1992 Said Mekhloufi Jihadi Salafist and
Afghans
Merged with the GIA in 1994,
but split from GIA shortly
after




Djaz’ara Merged with GIA in 1994;
purged from GIA in 1995
Groupe Islamique Armé GIA 1992 Abdelhaq Layada Jihadi Salafist Split in 1998 into the GIA and
GSPC; ceased to exist by 2004
Armée Islamique du Salut AIS 1994 Madani Mezraq Salafist and
Djaz’ara
Agreed to ceasefire and




LIDD 1997 Ali Benhadjar Djaz’ara Agreed to join AIS ceasefire
and amnesty by 2000
Groupe Salafiste pour la
Prédication et le
Combat
GSPC 1998 Hassan Hattab Jihadi Salafist Continued to fight the
Algerian regime and became
Al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb in 2007





































portfolio and claim to leadership was clearly intended to offer the AIS as an alternative
faction.
Ideological demarcations between the GIA and AIS
The GIA and AIS advanced diametrically opposed conflict framing, conflict objectives,
and targeting policies. These divergences were rooted in an ideological divide as to the role
of democracy in Islam, the permissibility of Islamists joining secular political systems, and
the centrality of violence in building an Islamic state. Table 5 summarizes the main
ideological divides between the two factions.
It is important to highlight that these ideological divisions pre-dated the civil war (see
the aforementioned Table 3); they were not endogenous to their fratricidal conflicts. Many
of the individuals that formed the GIA previously refused to participate within FIS’s party
apparatus during the electoral phase. Moreover, they refused to form a unified rebel
movement with other FIS leaders once the civil war broke out, insisting on their own
rebel formation.56 It was only after they established themselves by 1994 that they agreed to
absorb former FIS leaders into their faction, insisting that they renounce the FIS and join
as individuals, not as representatives of other armed groups. Thus, rather than being
endogenous to the emergence of the AIS, GIA’s extremity was present from the outset.
From the start of the civil war, the GIA promoted conflict frames that portrayed the
Algerian state as a tyrannical apostate regime, and its supporters and employees as equally
culpable in perpetuating apostasy. Jamal Zitouni, the fifth GIA leader, maintained in his
1995 tract The Guidance of the Lord that “the [GIA] considers the institutions of the
(Algerian) state, from its agencies and ministers, to its courts and legislative and parlia-
mentary assemblies, to its army, gendarme and police, to be apostate institutions.”57 It
rejected the possibility of negotiations or reconciliation with moderate regime elements
that were interested in ending the crisis, and instead raised the mantra of “no dialogue, no
ceasefire, no reconciliation, and no security or guarantees with the apostate regime.”58 It
also denied the possibility of neutrality in the conflict, and treated security forces and
public workers as part and parcel of the apostate order. In sum, the GIA advanced a total
war conflict frame and insisted on system transformation, not reintegration into the
electoral process. In contrast, FIS’s leadership on the eve of repression was solidly behind
the electoral process and rejected violence as a means to establish an Islamic state. Its
armed wing, the AIS, similarly insisted that the struggle was between a hawkish faction
Table 5. Ideological differences between the GIA and AIS.
Ideological Dimension GIA AIS
Conflict Framing Religious war borne out of a secular order in
which an apostate regime rules over Muslims
with man-made laws. The entire system is
heretical
Political crisis provoked by an extreme
military faction that subverted the
democratic process and contravened the will
of the people
Conflict Objectives Total war for system transformation and the
creation of an Islamic State through jihad. No
negotiations or compromise with an apostate
regime
Limited war for system reintegration and
return to the electoral process through a
negotiated political settlement
Targeting Portfolio Any individual who works for the Algerian
state; economic and educational
infrastructure; journalists; foreigners; secular
intellectuals; civilians; France
Limited to the Algerian security forces and
government officials associated with the
coup





































within the regime that opposed a just political settlement and Islamists who were deprived
the fruits of their electoral victories. The AIS did not view the war in terms of apostasy,
and rarely averred that all who work with the Algerian state are enemies of the movement.
It sought to reintegrate Islamists into the political process, and did not insist on the
complete transformation of the Algerian state into a theocratic one.
The GIA believed democracy is heresy, and jihad was inevitable because secular rulers
would never relinquish power without a fight.59 Although the coup was the impetus for
the armed movement, the leaders of the GIA did not refer to the coup to justify their
jihad. On the contrary, the literature of the GIA rarely mentioned it or did so only to deny
that it motivated its insurgency. For example, an August 1993 communiqué by the third
GIA commander, Jafar al-Afghani (an Algerian “Afghan”), clarified that “the Armed
Islamic Group was not born today; it was in secret preparation for years, but its entry
into open jihadist military operations was precisely a year and 10 months ago, that is since
the Guemmar operation [less than two months prior to the coup].”60 The refusal of the
GIA to use the coup as its justification for armed struggle is logical in light of its rejection
of the electoral process and democracy.
In contrast, Madani Mezraq, AIS’s general commander, explained years later that “we
fought on the basis of two principles: a return to the legitimate political process and respect
for the choice of the Algerian people.”61 The AIS portrayed its jihad as a struggle against a
self-interested elite who put an end to an otherwise legitimate process. They wanted a return
to the system that briefly came into being and was subverted by the putschists.
In addition to divergent conflict framing, the GIA and AIS were also completely
opposed on conflict objectives and targeting policies. The GIA waged a total war to induce
the collapse of the regime.62 Violence initially took the form of clashes with security forces
and assassinations of policemen and military personnel. In 1993, its violence began to
expand to include government officials—especially those who were members of the quasi-
parliamentary National Consultative Council and the National Transition Council.
Violence then expanded to include representatives of opposition groups, foreigners and,
shortly after, journalists and intellectuals. However, since 1995 the victims of violence
were mainly civilians, killed randomly through bombings or deliberately through indis-
criminate attacks in villages, markets, cafés, and fake checkpoints.
The GIA also sought to undermine the economic foundations of the state and disrupt
the day-to-day functioning of the government. Between 1995 and 1998 there were
approximately 5,400 sabotage operations. The gas and electric company reported 722
acts of sabotage while the post and telephone communications infrastructures suffered
434 attacks. Roads and bridges—260 of them—were not spared acts of sabotage.63 The
GIA threatened state employees because they enabled the day-to-day functioning of the
regime. It began to execute them, often at fake security checkpoints where those identified
as state workers were simply shot, hacked to death, or had their throats slit. Schools and
school workers were constant targets from 1992 onwards.64
In contrast to the expansive violence of the GIA, the AIS limited its violence to security
forces and government officials.65 The AIS opposed and denounced attacks on intellec-
tuals, foreigners, and anyone who was not directly involved in the persecution of Islamists
because such violence discredited the image of the movement and played into the hands of
the “eradicationists” within the regime. Thus, rather than seek to outbid the GIA with
escalatory violence, the AIS sought to differentiate itself by insisting on targeted violence





































in self-defense against a regime that overturned the choice of the people and turned to
violent repression against a legitimate, legal party.66
Threat perceptions, boundary hardening, and fratricidal violence
The biggest beneficiaries of the 1992 coup were the Jihadi Salafis who were completely
marginalized within the broader Islamist movement during the electoral phase. Political
participation sidelined them because of their ideological opposition to hizbiyya (partisan
divides among Muslims) and democracy, and because they could not compete with estab-
lished leaders whose activism goes as far back as the 1960s. The coup presented them with a
golden opportunity to remake the Islamist movement in their own image, as their main
competitors were either in prison, exile, or members within their organization. As one GIA
commander stated plainly in the May 1994 unification meetings, “The FIS is to be credited for
bringing the masses to this point, for which we are grateful, but it is unable to continue the
march because of its limitations. It put too much emphasis on the political (electoral) strategy
without ever having prepared for the jihad that was on the horizon. We are the ones who first
sacrificed [during 1992–1994] and we have proven our ability to lead.”67
The palpable sense of ascendancy was diminished by the creation of the AIS in July
1994, and its insistence on a negotiated settlement with the regime as opposed to waging
total war to establish an Islamic state by force. The AIS wanted to restore the pre-civil war
equilibrium in which radicals were subordinate to the historic leadership of the Islamist
movement. In a telling interview, Madani Mezraq, AIS’s general commander, betrayed his
disdain for the GIA’s upstart leadership:
The AIS was made up of known leaders who were part of the preachers’ movement (haraka
da’awiyya) that later became responsible representatives and leaders within the FIS. . . . The
GIA, on the other hand, was not a well-integrated movement. It had many factions,
Bouyalists [rebels from an earlier period] . . . and takfiris [those who excommunicate
Muslims] full of a virulent form of Salafism that denounced governments and people, and
even us, as infidels. . . . It was a cocktail of factions.68
Interestingly, ‘Asem Abi Hayan, a former GIA commander who went on to become a
leading sharia official within Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), also shares this
assessment of the GIA. When asked what explains the deviation of the GIA, he gives two
reasons:
(1) Its poor socialization in Islamic law and ethics, as well as its extreme religious
positions based on a misapprehension of Islamic scripture.
(2) The presence of many doctrinal viewpoints within a single group, which created
mistrust among the people of competing perspectives and the instinct to eliminate
them from the field.69
GIA’s expansive violence against Algerian civilians intensified criticism of its legiti-
macy, leading many Algerian Islamists to aver publicly that the GIA was an arm of the
Algerian intelligence services. Thus, critics of indiscriminate violence threatened to dele-
gitimize GIA’s leadership.





































As a result, the GIA struck back by denouncing their critics, demanding they cease their
criticism of the “jihad.” Open war between the GIA and AIS began on May 4, 1995, when
the former issued a communiqué declaring that AIS leaders have a month to get in touch
with the GIA to repent and join its ranks.70 Shortly after, the GIA issued an explicit threat
against eight FIS leaders demanding they cease speaking in the name of the Islamist
movement.71 Finally, on June 13, 1995, the GIA issued communiqué #36, entitled “An
Open Letter to Abassi Madani and Ali Belhaj,” in which it symbolically ousted the two
imprisoned leaders from its consultative council and permitted “the shedding of the blood
of those ‘blood merchants’ inside and outside (Algeria) unless they repent.”72
The AIS initially avoided organizing in GIA’s main areas of operation, for fear of
sparking confrontation. As FIS leader Abderlkarim Ghamati explained, “the AIS formed
an initial organization of approximately 50 individuals in the middle, but the [GIA]
threatened to kill them. [Therefore,] we decided not to open the door of battle with [the
GIA].”73 Azzedin Ba‘a, one of the leaders of the MEI who refused to unify ranks with the
GIA in May 1994, was killed by the latter in June 1995.74 The following month, the GIA
executed one of the original founders of the FIS, Abedlbaqi Sahroui, in a Paris mosque.
Two of the FIS leaders who defected to the GIA in May 1994, Abdelrazak Rejjam and
Yousuf Boubras, withdrew their groups from the GIA in 1995 after accusing the latter of
justifying the killing of the innocent.75 In November 1995, the GIA executed Rejjam and
Muhammad Said (both prominent FIS leaders, and known preachers, associated with the
Djaz’ara faction that joined the GIA in May 1994).76 These executions were not isolated
leadership purges. There were repeated reports in 1995 of clashes between the GIA and
AIS, resulting in the death of approximately 60 militants.77 After a series of warnings and
threats, the GIA explicitly declared war on the AIS on January 4, 1996.78 Later that month,
sources close to the FIS Executive Body Abroad (under Rabeh Kebir) accused the GIA of
slaying 140 FIS activists, including 40 commanders.79
The GIA under Zitouni and his successor Antar Zouabri also engaged in intense
boundary hardening that further polarized the armed movement.80 When GIA leaders
feared that some of the latecomers to their faction were not committed to their Salafist
worldview and total war objectives, they began to purge them from the organization. In
Zitouni’s tract, The Guidance of the Lord, he rejected any alliance with groups such as Hizb
al-Tahrir and the Takfir wal Hijra, both of whom are considered radical groups by any
standard. In the same year, the GIA executed approximately 100 “takfiris” allegedly for
transgressions against civilians.81 These attempts at boundary policing proved counter-
productive as many militias opted to split from the GIA, and ordinary citizens who
previously were sympathetic to the Islamist cause defected to state paramilitary militias.82
As other groups within the GIA expressed their dissent, they were purged and pun-
ished. Mustapha Karatali, the commander of al-Rahman militia in the Larbaa region,
accused the GIA leader of massacring relatives of the militia at fake checkpoints. The
break began when the GIA issued an order to target the families of police and security
forces. After refusing to abide by this order, Zitouni sought to insert new militias into the
Larbaa region, a move rejected by Karatali. He explained the reason for splitting from the
GIA in the following terms: “We fled (to the mountains) to die as a persecuted people not
as persecutors or perpetrators of killing the innocent.”83
GIA’s fratricidal violence—against former supporters and rival rebels—reached stupe-
fying levels in a series of massacres that began to take place at the end of 1996. In response





































to rebel defections and the rise of pro-government paramilitary militias (officially known
as the Groupes de Légitime Défense, commonly referred to as “Patriots”), the GIA
unleashed massacres to impose their authority in their strongholds as well as punish
those who had taken up arms against them.84 At least 76 massacres took place between
November 1996 and July 2001, most of which were in 1997 (42 massacres). Massacres
were concentrated in villages around Algiers, Blida and Medea (south of Algiers), Ain
Defla (southwest of Algiers), and Relizane (west of Algiers). All these were within the
GIA’s areas of operation.85
One massacre targeted GIA’s former allies who had defected to form the Islamic League
for Preaching and Jihad (Ligue Islamique pour Da’wa and Djihad, LIDD). In Ktiten village
in al-Medea province, the GIA went after the extended family of Ali Benhadjar, LIDD’s
commander, “who was coordinating with the AIS and whose group assassinated Zitouni,
the GIA Emir, in 1996.”86 In another massacre in Bentalha, the GIA targeted relatives of
AIS fighters belonging to Zone Six fighters and their commander Awad Bou Abdullah.87
In 1997, the AIS essentially defected to the state. It agreed to call for a ceasefire without
any substantial concessions from the regime, and even engaged in operations to clear out
the GIA from AIS’s stronghold in the Jijel mountains with state support.88 The AIS saw
indiscriminate violence as a threat to its political project and declared a unilateral ceasefire
to avoid a two-front war with the regime and the GIA. Given that the AIS never justified
its struggle against the state in religious terms, and once it became clear that armed
struggle was damaging Islamists’ standing with the public, it made little sense to continue
with the insurgency. The AIS was created to offer an alternative to total war and as a way
to force the government to negotiate a settlement with the FIS. Once it became clear that
the armed struggle was not serving this aim, the AIS quit the fight.
Assessing the resource and power explanations
The previous discussion highlights the centrality of ideological divides in structuring the
rebel movement into competing armed factions as well as producing conflict and even-
tually fratricide between the two dominant factions. It demonstrates through detailed
process tracing how a direct challenge from a proxidistant ideological group produced
threats to intra-factional cohesion and fears of inter-factional marginalization. The AIS
chose to deal with those threats through balancing and (later) defecting, whereas the GIA
opted for intimidation and fratricide. These divergent responses to threat perceptions
suggests that organizational attributes such as the degree of extremism matter in produ-
cing divergent outcomes. It is reasonable to assert, therefore, that the Algerian case
demonstrates the feasibility of hypotheses 4–7.
The power and resource competition hypotheses (1–3) seem to have limited explana-
tory power in the Algerian case study. The first hypothesis expects rebel fratricide to
emerge when rebel groups feel confident about their ability to ward off regime offensives.
Less concerned about their security, rebel factions can prioritize enhancing their relative
power at the expense of their rivals. This hypothesis is not borne out in Algeria. Sustained
rebel fratricide began in 1995, peaked in 1997, and diminished after 1998. Most experts on
Algeria treat this period (1995–1998) as one of government recovery, especially after the
November 1995 elections, which produced a large voter turnout despite death threats
from the GIA.89 The total rebel force in 1995 is estimated at 10,000–28,000 militants.90





































The Algerian military had about 140,000 troops in 1994 and augmented that force with
another 150,000 local militias by 1997.91 In 1995, it had an elite anti-guerrilla corps made
up of 60,000 army, gendarmerie, and police personnel.92 The Algerian state was also
spending 4.6% of its GDP on defense expenditures, which was up from 1.7% in the mid-
1980s.93 With the help of France, it was able to renegotiate with the IMF new terms to
service its debt obligations and acquire a much-needed loan to prosecute the war.94 The
French authorities were also supplying the Algerian state with valuable intelligence and
cracking down on GIA networks in France.95 Lastly, by 1995, the Algerian regime had
managed to kill or capture three successive GIA national leaders. There is little evidence
therefore that the rebels were confident in their ability to ward off state offensives prior to
the commencement of fratricidal violence.
The second hypothesis expects that an imbalance of power between rebel factions will
invite fratricide, with the greater likelihood that the strong faction will seek to eliminate
the weaker ones. Estimating the “power” of a rebel group is tricky, but if we simply look at
the size of the GIA and AIS between 1994–1995 and 1998–2000—i.e., the period of rebel
fratricide—we will see that both factions were roughly balanced during this timeframe.
Table 6 offers the range of available estimates.
One can argue that the GIA had a greater sense of power because it included
seasoned fighters by way of the “Algerian Afghans” and because the unification of
rebels under its banner in May 1994 made it abundantly clear that it was the
predominant faction in the civil war, which is what prompted the formation of the
AIS as a balancing force. The GIA also had support from the emerging Al Qaeda
transnational network, including fighters from nearby Libya.96 However, the GIA
also began to experience splits due to its controversial violence and undertook
internal purges in 1995–1996, which is right before the peak of fratricidal infighting
and massacres. Therefore, the evidence for hypothesis 2 is tenuous at best. It is based
on a subjective overestimation of GIA’s own capabilities rather than an objective
reading of the balance of forces in the insurgent field.
The third hypothesis expects that rebel fratricide will mainly revolve around
control over the war economy and, therefore, fighting will be concentrated in
resource-rich regions where economic control translates into military and political
power. On this point, the evidence from the Algerian case is mixed at best.
According to Hagelstein, most of the violence in Algeria was concentrated in the
Algiers-Boumerdes urban area in the northern central part of the country. The
Meftah and the Chrea mountains in Blida province were GIA strongholds, while
the “areas around Lakhdaria, Zharbar (Bouira), the Ouarsenis mountains
(Tissemsilt), Collo (Skikda), and the Chekfa mountains (Jijel)” were AIS areas.97
These offered a complex topography and dense forestry, which were ideal for hiding,
Table 6. Rebel size estimates as measure of power.
Low-High Estimates 1994–1995 Low-High Estimates 1998–2001
Rebel Faction Low High Low High
GIA 2,000103 5,000104 5,000105 6,800106
AIS 4,000107 8,000108 4,800109 6,000110





































but were also close to major urban population centers where militants concentrated
much of their violence. However, Algeria’s main hydrocarbon fields are located in
the thinly populated eastern and southern regions of the country, well out of the
rebels’ reach at the height of the insurgency. Given that more than 90% of Algeria’s
export revenues are derived from hydrocarbons, the military allocated a force of
45,000 men to secure these facilities from insurgent attacks.98
This does not mean that rebels did not compete for resources and territory. Martinez
details how rebels sought control over strategic and secondary roads with high commercial
vehicle traffic that could be confiscated or taxed, and he highlights how extortion rackets
were an important source of revenue for competing rebel commanders and criminal
upstarts pretending to be jihadists.99 Yet Martinez stops short of claiming that the GIA-
AIS competition was purely about territorial control. Rebel economic predation seemed
more about individual social advancement than group conflicts.
More generally, the resource conflict argument raises more puzzles than it answers in
the Algerian case. First, why did the centrist AIS (or MIA before it) not initiate violence
against the GIA if it was equally interested in establishing a monopoly over the war
economy? The fratricide in Algeria appears to be unidirectional with the extremist GIA
doing most of the predatory attacks. Additionally, why did the GIA engage in intra-
organizational purges against factions that merged with it when it could have channeled
those forces to take territory from the AIS? These purges led to defections that ultimately
weakened the GIA in its competition with the AIS.
Conclusion
Ali Benhadjar, a former GIA commander who split to form the LIDD in 1997, summar-
ized the fault lines dividing the GIA from his group and the AIS: “We would have
preferred political means if our rights had been respected. Our armed struggle was in
self-defense. For the GIA, the only true struggle was the armed struggle. Anything else was
haram [forbidden in Islam].”100
This insider’s assessment, and many others cited earlier, does not accord with the
prevailing theorizing on rebel fragmentation and infighting, which treats ideological
divides as endogenous to competition over material resources and the distribution of
power. This study is a corrective on the curious neglect of ideology in factionalized civil
wars, and a modest contribution to a burgeoning body of scholarship that seeks to bring
back politics and ideology in the study of civil wars.101 It argues that ideology matters in
structuring rebel factionalism, in generating competitive dynamics among rebels, and in
producing infighting. It introduces the paradox of proxidistant factions, i.e., ones that are
ideologically proximate in origins and ultimate objectives, but ideologically distant on key
conflict issues.
The Algerian civil war offers substantiating evidence that the ideological divergence
between rebel factions along three dimensions—conflict framing, conflict objectives, and
targeting policy—threatens intra-group cohesion and heightens fears of group margin-
alization. However, the Algerian case also shows that not all factions respond to these dual
threats with fratricide. Ideologically centrist groups like the AIS will opt to balance against
their rivals, whereas ideologically extreme groups like the GIA are more likely to respond
to threats by engaging in the external suppression of their rivals. Extremists have in place





































the permissive ideational structure for rebel fratricide because of their polarizing conflict
frames, system transformation objectives, and indiscriminate targeting policy.
These differences suggest that future research on fragmented conflicts should take
seriously the role of ideas and factional politics in explaining inter-rebel dynamics.
Investigating organizational attributes, not just the structural conditions that invite com-
petition and conflict, are necessary to better understand who is likely to initiate fratricide
and who is likely to adopt less extreme forms of competition. For example, how might the
magnitude of internal factionalism within a rebel organization heighten sensitivity to the
presence of ideological competitors in the rebel movement? Also, how does one disen-
tangle personal or idiosyncratic leadership qualities from ideological considerations in
rebel fratricide? Interestingly, in the Algerian case, the actors involved placed tremendous
explanatory power on the poor ideological socialization of GIA’s younger leadership and
the introduction of ideologically extreme worldviews into its leadership hierarchy.
Asserting the centrality of ideology in fratricidal practices does not negate the role of “need
and greed” in conflict dynamics; future research could benefit from an integration of “need,
creed, and greed” variables. Competition over resources and the distribution of power within a
rebel movement are important permissive material structures for fragmentation and infight-
ing, but many rebel groups avoid the trap of fratricide even though they confront the same
power asymmetries and resource conflicts as those who do succumb to warring factionalism.
Differential outcomes under the same structural opportunities and constraints suggest that
unit level or dyadic level variables are also important for a complete and compelling explana-
tion of rebel fratricide.
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